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The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment ensures that no person shall
be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”1 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held this to require that all criminal defendants be found guilty
only when guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 The requirement of the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard—the highest evidentiary burden in our legal
system—is often attributed to “a fundamental value determination of our society that
it is far worse to convict an innocent man than let a guilty man go free.”3 Our
criminal system presumes innocence and by embracing the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, disproving innocence is an extremely difficult task, and for good
reason. However, the current sentencing guidelines, which provide guidance to the
federal judiciary in issuing criminal sentences, endorse a practice that allows
individuals to be punished for crimes for which they have never been convicted.
Sean Michael Grier is a victim of this loophole. He was charged with a single
crime.4 He pled guilty to a single crime.5 He was convicted of a single crime.6 Yet
the length of his current prison sentence is based on a court’s finding that he

1.

U.S. Const. amend. V.

2.

See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional
stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).

3.

Justice Harlan emphasized that the requirement of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in proving a
criminal charge, “reflect[s] a very fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous
factual determinations.” Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan explained that the factfinder in a judicial proceeding is never able to make a determination of fact based on actual knowledge,
but rather his or her determination of fact is made on beliefs based on the evidence presented. Id. It
therefore follows that “the trier of fact will sometimes, despite his best efforts, be wrong in his factual
conclusions.” Id. The frequency of factually erroneous determinations is thus influenced by the burden
of persuasion used in proving criminal guilt, and therefore embracing the highest evidentiary standard
in making this determination reflects a core societal value. Id. at 372; see also Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790, 802–03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It is the duty of the Government to establish . . .
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion—basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free
society—is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of due
process.”); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895) (stating the beyond a reasonable doubt
requirement is implicit in “constitutions . . . [that] recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed
essential for the protection of life and liberty”).

4.

Grier was also charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), possession of a stolen firearm, but the charge
was dropped pursuant to his plea agreement. See United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 559 (3d Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3159 (2007).

5.

Id.

6.

Id.
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committed two separate crimes.7 Under the current United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”),8 this practice has been deemed permissible.9
In United States v. Grier, the defendant Grier pled guilty to being a convicted
felon in possession of a firearm,10 a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).11 At sentencing
the court imposed a four-level sentence enhancement12 pursuant to section 2K2.1(b)
(5) of the U.S.S.G.13 based on its finding by a preponderance of the evidence,14 rather
than beyond a reasonable doubt,15 that the appellant had committed a felony offense
7.

Id. at 559–60.

8.

The U.S.S.G. provides an advisory basis for the majority of sentences issued by federal courts. Grier,
475 F.3d at 560 (recognizing “that the Guidelines were advisory . . . ”); United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005). In Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, the Court in Booker held that, as applied,
the U.S.S.G. was unconstitutional, and instead held that the guidelines must instead be advisory.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 145–46 (“We conclude that this provision must be severed and excised, as must one
other statutory section, § 3742(e) . . . , which depends upon the Guidelines’ mandatory nature. So
modified, the federal sentencing statute, see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 . . . as amended, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 991 et seq., makes the Guidelines effectively advisory. It requires a sentencing
court to consider Guidelines ranges . . . but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other
statutory concerns as well . . . .”).

9.

See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (2007).

10. Grier, 475 F.3d at 559.
11.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for
any person who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year; to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).

12. While the enhancement associated with this finding was a four-level increase, the court also granted a

two-level downward departure based on the assault victim’s partial responsibility for the assault at issue.
See Grier, 475 F.3d at 560.
13. The enhancement was based on what was then U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), but what is now U.S.S.G. §

2K2.1(b)(6), which states:
If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another
felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge,
intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another
felony offense, increase by 4 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 18,
increase to level 18.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6) (2007).
14.

The “by a preponderance of the evidence” standard is a lower evidentiary burden than the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard associated with determinations of guilt. See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th
ed. 2004) (citing Charles Herman Kinnane, A First Book on Anglo-American Law 562 (2d ed.
1952) (defining “preponderance of the evidence” as “the greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily
established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most
convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from
all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather
than the other.”)).

15.

In criminal cases the prosecution is required to prove all elements of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining “reasonable doubt” as “[t]he
doubt that prevents one from being firmly convinced of a defendant’s guilt, or the belief that there is a
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while unlawfully possessing a firearm.16 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit applied a Sixth Amendment analysis in upholding the application of
the preponderance standard, despite the appellant’s challenge that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the sentencing factor instead be found by
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.17 This case comment argues that the
“commission of a separate felony” enhancement factor is distinguishable from all
other U.S.S.G. enhancement factors because it is equivalent to a finding of guilt for
the commission of a crime. Therefore, this particular enhancement should require
the evidentiary standard constitutionally mandated for proving the commission of a
crime. The Grier court’s imposition of an enhanced sentence, based on a
preponderance of the evidence that the appellant committed a felony separate from
the crime for which he was convicted, was therefore a violation of the appellant’s
Fifth Amendment right to the due process of law.18
Sean Michael Grier’s legal troubles began with a dispute over a cable bill.19
Grier’s girlfriend was holding a bike belonging to her brother Juan Navarro as security
for his outstanding cable tab.20 This angered Navarro, who approached Grier outside
of Grier’s girlfriend’s home and demanded his bike be returned. 21 When Grier
refused, Navarro threatened him.22 Grier, however, continued to refuse to return the
bike and, despite warnings from onlookers that Grier had a gun, Navarro swung at

real possibility that a defendant is not guilty”) (citing Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.)
295, 320 (1850) (Shaw, J.) (“Reasonable doubt . . . is a term often used, probably pretty well understood,
but not easily defined. It is not a mere possible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs,
and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the
case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors
in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth
of the charge.”)).
16. Grier, 475 F.3d at 560. The district court identified the “separate offense” as being aggravated assault a

violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a) which states:
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life . . .
(4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon . . . .
Id. at n.2.
17.

Id. at 561.

18. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the

reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.”).
19.

Grier, 475 F.3d at 559.

20. Id.
21.

Id.

22.

Id.
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him.23 Although Navarro missed Grier initially, the failed punch was enough to
initiate a brawl and the two men quickly tumbled to the ground engaging in a
physical struggle.24 A shot was fired during the altercation, at which point the two
men separated unharmed.25 Upon separating, Grier pointed the gun at Navarro.26
Navarro responded by trying to charge Grier, but in a scene resembling that of a
Shakespearean tragedy, he was held back by members of the crowd.27 Grier then
fired a second shot into the air dispersing the crowd, again injuring no one.28 Navarro
and Grier fled the scene, and Grier dumped the gun into a trash can as he fled.29
Following the incident, local police initiated an investigation that eventually led
to the discovery of the discarded gun.30 Upon running a check on the weapon, the
police learned that it had been stolen.31 Grier was then arrested by local authorities
for aggravated assault, receiving stolen property, and unlawful possession of a
firearm.32 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania dismissed all three counts in August
2003.33 Shortly thereafter, Grier was indicted on the federal charge of possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, to which he pled guilty.34
As is customary in preparation for a federal conviction, 35 the Department of
Corrections issued a presentence report (“PSR”).36 The PSR suggested the court
impose a four-level enhancement37 to Grier’s sentence for his use of a firearm in
23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26. Id.
27.

Id.

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Id. It is unknown why the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania dropped the state charges against Grier.

34. Id.
35.

Susan M. Kole, Annotation, Right of Convicted Defendant or Prosecution to Receive Updated Presentence
Report at Sentencing Proceedings, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 660 (1994).
In the federal system, under Federal [Rule 32(c)(1)], the probation service of the court is
directed to make a presentence report for all offenders . . . . Federal [Rule 32(c)(1)],
specifically provides that the probation office “shall” make a presentence investigation and
report to the court before a defendant is sentenced, unless the court finds that there is
sufficient information in the record to enable meaningful exercise of sentencing authority
and this finding is explained on the record. The determination that there is sufficient
information in the record must be made before sentence is imposed.
Id.

36. Grier, 475 F.3d at 559.
37.

Federal sentencing recommendations assess a sentence range based on the “applicable category of offense
committed by the applicable category of defendant.” 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 872 (2000). The
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“connection with another felony offense,” pursuant to section 2K2.1(b)(6). 38 The
report detailed the other “felony offense” as felony assault under Pennsylvania law.39
While the four-level sentence enhancement did not exceed the federal statutory
maximum sentence associated with a violation of the crime for which Grier was
convicted,40 it exposed him to a fifty percent increase in recommended jail time.41
The district court adopted the PSR and applied the four-level enhancement.42 Grier
objected to the enhancement and a sentencing hearing was held to determine the
validity of his objection.43
At the sentencing hearing before the district court, both parties argued over the
government’s burden of persuasion in proving the facts necessary to establish grounds
for the enhancement.44 While it is customary to apply the preponderance standard
in finding the existence of facts relevant to sentencing,45 the defense argued that the
particular sentencing factor at issue—that of the commission of another felony
offense—requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.46 The court adopted the
government’s position that the preponderance standard should govern.47
The government’s only evidence in support of its contention that Grier used the
gun in commission of another felony was the testimony of Juan Navarro, the instigator
of the assault at issue.48 Navarro testified that he never saw Grier pull the gun from
his clothing, and that the gun may have just fallen out of Grier’s pockets at some
point during the fight.49 The defense then stated that even if Grier had pulled the
gun on Navarro, he would have been acting in self-defense, as Navarro instigated the
court may then enhance the sentence, or depart from the range, based on findings of sentencing factors.
Id.
38. Grier, 475 F.3d at 559. The enhancement is currently codified under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6). See supra

note 13.
39.

Grier, 475 F.3d at 559–60 (citing 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)).

40. The statutory maximum associated with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is a prison sentence of ten

years. Id.
41.

Without the four-level separate offense enhancement Grier’s recommended imprisonment range would
have been 84 to 105 months. With the four-level enhancement, Grier’s recommended imprisonment
range was between 120 to 160 months. See id. at 560.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44. Id.
45.

Id. at 561 (“Under an advisory Guidelines scheme, district courts should continue to make factual
findings by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .”).

46. Id. at 560; see also Brief of Appellant at 11, United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. May 11, 2005)

(No. 05-1698). The district court imposed the enhancement based on facts that it found using the
preponderance of evidence standard instead of the required beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Brief
of Appellant, Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (No. 05-1698).
47.

Grier, 475 F.3d at 560.

48. Id.
49. Id.
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fight.50 As self-defense is a complete defense to aggravated assault, Grier argued that
he could not be found to have committed the additional felony offense necessary to
warrant the four-level enhancement.51 Grier further argued that even if the court
did not find that he had acted in self-defense, under Pennsylvania law he still had
not committed the felony of aggravated assault but merely “simple assault by mutual
consent.”52 Simple assault under Pennsylvania law is categorized as a misdemeanor
and punishable by no more than a year in prison.53 The offense, therefore, does not
trigger the enhancement under the U.S.S.G.54 Nevertheless, the court, in applying
the preponderance standard, adopted the recommendations laid out in the PSR and
applied the four-level enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(5).55 Grier was sentenced
to 100 months in prison.56
This decision was appealed, but before analyzing the court of appeals decision, it
is necessary to give some context for a discussion of the evidentiary burden of proof
50. Id.
51.

Brief of Appellant, supra note 46, at 7 (“Grier argued . . . that he acted in self-defense, which is a
complete defense . . . .”).

52.

Grier, 475 F.3d at 560 n.3 (citing 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §2701). Pennsylvania law defines simple assault
as:
a) Offense defined. A person is guilty of assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another;
(2) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; [or]
(3) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury . . . .
(b) Grading.-Simple assault is a misdemeanor of the second degree unless committed . . .
in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a misdemeanor of
the third degree . . . .
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701. This is opposed to aggravated assault, which is defined as an attempt: “(1)
to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; [or] (4) [an] attempt[s]
to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon . . . .” 18 Pa.
Cons.Stat. § 2702(a)). It is worth noting that this particular issue is still unresolved. Upon further
appeal, the Third Circuit remanded the issue of whether the assault enhancement was correctly applied
based on an incomplete record in support of a finding of the commission of aggravated rather than
simple assault. See United States v. Grier, No. 07-4671, 2008 WL 5114621 (3d Cir. Dec. 4, 2008).
While the sentence may be reduced pending the outcome of this case, the issue of which evidentiary
burden is appropriate has been fully resolved by the court. Id.

53.

Grier, 475 F.3d at 560.

54. Brief of Appellant, supra note 46, at 8. A “felony” for the purpose of a Section 2K2.1(b)(5) four-level

enhancement is a crime with a term of imprisonment that exceeds one year. Id. A felony offense is “any
offense (federal, state, or local) punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, whether or
not a criminal charge was brought, or conviction obtained.” Id. (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 2K1.3 app. 4 (2007)).
55.

Grier, 475 F.3d at 560.

56. The court’s final sentence included a two-level downward departure as a result of the victim Juan

Navarro’s partial responsibility for the assault that served as the basis for the four-level enhancement.
Id. at 560.
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required in proving the existence of sentencing factors. The Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in this area is muddled and contradictory.57 Over the course of the
past century the Court has spawned two schools of thought on evidentiary burdens
required at sentencing. For the purposes of this comment, these two lines of cases
will be referred to as the Apprendi line and the McMillan line. The Apprendi line of
cases focuses on the effect constitutional safeguards have on the criminal defendant,
as opposed to the McMillan line of cases, which takes a more formalistic approach to
allocating burdens of proof and gives great deference to state legislatures. Apprendi
v. New Jersey and its progeny have repeatedly held that defendants are entitled to jury
findings by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of any fact which exposes them
to sentences exceeding statutory maximums.58 In contrast, the McMillan line of
cases has given states leeway in redefining elements of crimes as sentencing factors,
in what can be described as an attempt to avoid granting constitutional safeguards to
criminal defendants.59
The current prevailing rule, which follows the Apprendi line of cases, is that as
long as the finding of sentencing factors does not increase the defendant’s sentence
beyond the statutory maximum associated with the defendant’s conviction, a court
may make its finding of said factors by the application of a lower evidentiary standard

57.

Compare Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704
(1975), with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1997), and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,
81 (1986).

58. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (clarifying the rule set forth in Apprendi by

holding: “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”); Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 490 (holding that, in determining whether New Jersey’s hate crime statute, which allowed the
sentencing judge to double the sentence range based on a finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant committed the crime with bias towards a particular race, violated the Constitution,
any fact that increases the maximum penalty to which the defendant is exposed must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt to a jury); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 326–27 (1985) (extending the ideals of
Winship to the presumption of innocence by holding it impermissible for the state to legislatively create
mandatory presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant for elements of the
offense); Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704 (holding, in striking down Maine’s murder statute, which put the
burden on the defendant to disprove the element that distinguished murder from the lesser crime of
manslaughter, that “the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . the mens rea component of the crime of murder”); Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (“Lest there
remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold
that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
59.

McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81 (holding that the state’s designation of “visible possession of a firearm” as an
enhancement rather than an element of a crime was constitutionally permissible as it did not raise the
ceiling of the defendant’s potential sentence, but merely raised the f loor if the fact was found by a
preponderance of the evidence by a sentencing judge); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207–08 (holding, by taking
a formalistic approach, that the New York legislature’s decision to place the burden on the defendant to
prove extreme emotional disturbance in order to mitigate murder to manslaughter was constitutionally
permissible, even though it was essentially the inverse to the Mullaney decision); Leland, 343 U.S. at 800
(upholding the state’s decision to require defendants to prove the defense of insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt because sanity hearings were collateral to criminal proceedings).
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than would otherwise be necessary to prove guilt.60 This comment argues that the
“commission of a separate felony” enhancement factor is equivalent to a finding of
guilt for the commission of a crime, and therefore should require proof by the
evidentiary standard constitutionally mandated for proving all other elements of
crimes charged, that is, beyond a reasonable doubt.61
On Grier’s appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
issued a two-to-one decision affirming the district court’s legal findings.62 Grier
then petitioned for, and was granted, a rehearing en banc.63 On February 5, 2007,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, issued its
opinion, which affirmed the district court’s holding that the preponderance standard
is appropriate for the finding of sentencing enhancements that do not increase
statutory maximums,64 including its finding that Grier committed a crime separate
from the one for which he was charged.65 The Supreme Court of the United States
denied certiorari.66
The Third Circuit held that the Due Process Clause does not require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of “facts relevant to enhancements under the U.S.S.G.,
particularly those that constitute a ‘separate offense’ under governing law,” unless a
finding of such facts would expose a defendant to a punishment exceeding the
statutory maximum.67 To support its holding, the court adopted the analysis set
forth in United States v. Booker.68 Booker presented the issue of whether imposing an
enhanced sentence in accordance with the U.S.S.G.69 violated the petitioners’70 Sixth
60. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (“[A]ny fact that increases penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
61.

Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.”).

62. Grier’s appeal was originally argued on October 25, 2005, before three judges on the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Following the death of one of the original three judges, the
quorum was reconstituted so that a holding could be issued. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, vacated, 453 F.3d 554
(3d Cir. 2006).
63. Grier, 453 F.3d at 554.
64. Grier, 475 F.3d at 572. While the court affirmed the lower court’s legal conclusions, the case was

remanded so that the district court could “explain its decision on the record, specifically by reference to
the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and further elaboration on its findings regarding the factual
underpinnings of the assault enhancement.” Id.
65.

Id. at 561.

66. Grier v. United States, 76 U.S.L.W. 3159 (2007) (denying certiorari).
67.

Grier, 475 F.3d at 561–62.

68. Id.
69. Prior to Booker, the U.S.S.G. were still mandatory under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Booker,

543 U.S. at 227.
70. The appeal was heard on behalf of two petitioners: Freddie J. Booker and Ducan Fanfan.

Id. at 220.
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Amendment rights.71 The Court in Booker cited its holdings in Blakely 72 and
Apprendi73 to support its holding that in order to protect a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial, any fact that exposes a defendant to a sentence that
exceeds the statutory maximum must be found by a jury.74 As Grier’s sentence did
not exceed the statutory maximum associated with the offense to which he plead
guilty, the protections implicated in Booker, as well as in Apprendi and Blakely, were
not triggered by the issue presented in Grier.75
While the Court in Booker conducted a thorough analysis of whether the
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated, it never reached the issue of
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the separate offense sentencing factor.76 And yet the court in
Grier held that “the discussion in Booker, regarding the Jury Clause of the Sixth
Amendment applies with equal force to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”77 The Grier court justified using a Sixth Amendment analysis for a
Fifth Amendment issue based on an unsubstantiated finding that the two amendments
are similar.78
71. Id. at 226. Booker was tried by a jury of his peers and found guilty of “possessing at least fifty grams of

crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) based on evidence” presented at trial. Id. at 235.
Based on the facts found by the jury as well as the offense category of the crime and Booker’s criminal
history, Booker was exposed to a sentence of 210–265 months. Id. However, the sentencing judge
imposed a sentence of 360 months based on his own factual findings never presented to the jury. Id.
72. In Blakely, the statute defining the crime committed by the defendant allowed for a sentence of up to ten

years imprisonment. Based on the facts proven to the jury, the defendant’s sentence was capped at fiftythree months. However after making additional findings, the sentencing judge added three years to the
fifty-three month maximum. The Court held the three year increase to be a violation of the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment rights and clarified the rule set forth in Apprendi by holding that “the ‘statutory
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (emphasis in
original).
73. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases

the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt”).
74.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 243–44. (“All of the foregoing supports our conclusion that our holding in Blakely
applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. We recognize, as we did in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely, that in
some cases jury fact-finding may impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants. But
the interest in fairness and reliability protected by the right to a jury trial—a common-law right that
defendants enjoyed for centuries and that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment—has always
outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.”).

75. Grier, 475 F.3d at 561 (“The primary issue in this case is whether the Due Process Clause requires facts

relevant to enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, particularly those that
constitute a ‘separate offense’ under governing law, to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
76. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226 (“The question presented in each of these cases is whether an application of the

Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.”).
77.

Grier, 475 F.3d at 561.

78. Id. (“The constitutional guarantees of ‘trial . . . by an impartial jury,’ U.S. Const. amend. VI, and ‘due

process of law,’ U.S. Const. amend. V, stand as a bulwark of individual liberty. They interpose between
the legislature and the court the community’s own judgment as to the existence of a crime.”); see also
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In her concurring opinion, Judge Ambro criticized the majority’s contention that
“the Supreme Court’s Apprendi line of cases, culminating at the federal level with
Booker, dictates the answer to the question presented here.”79 She believed that the
majority’s application of a Sixth Amendment analysis to a Fifth Amendment issue
was “too sweeping.” 80 Instead, she would have had the court apply the Fifth
Amendment standard set forth in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.81 Judge Ambro wrote
that “McMillan, unlike Booker, provides the most complete answer to the question
presented here.”82 In her opinion, McMillan stands for the proposition that the Due
Process Clause protects the finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, of “some facts below
the statutory maximum, even if the Sixth Amendment (pursuant to Apprendi) does
not.”83 Although Judge Ambro disapproved of the majority’s analysis,84 as well as its
acquiescence to a federal practice that imprisons individuals such as the appellant, in
part for crimes for which they were “never indicted, never tried, and never convicted,”85
Judge Ambro unfortunately did not find that the facts at issue in the present case
were among the protected factors under the McMillan standard and ultimately
concurred with the majority’s opinion.86
Judge Sloviter, in a dissenting opinion joined by Judge McKee, found that the
majority’s holding “abrogates one of the most important, if not the most important,
of the rights that the Constitution affords criminal defendants: the right to be found
guilty only by a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.”87 Judge Sloviter further criticized
the holding as being “without any support or precedent,”88 attacking not only the
majority’s “expansive interpretation of the language in the Booker opinion,”89 but also

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (characterizing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Jury
Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment as “associated” provisions).
79. Grier, 475 F.3d at 575 (Ambro, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 577.
81.

Id. at 578–80 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88 (“The statute gives no impression of having been tailored
to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”))
(discussing the three considerations of McMillan which have been distilled into the single metaphorical
standard which bars the use of a lower evidentiary standard in finding enhancement factors when the
finding of such factors is akin to “a tail which wags the dog”).

82. Id. at 577 (Ambro, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 573 (finding that while “[t]his practice may be efficient . . . it is not consistent with our Bill of

Rights”).
86. Id. at 583.
87.

Id. at 589 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

88. Id. at 591.
89. Id. at 589 (“Neither of the Supreme Court’s Booker decisions discussed the Fifth Amendment nor did

they suggest that it had no role in sentencing.”).
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its reliance on the commentary to section 6A1.3 of the U.S.S.G. as support.90 Judge
Sloviter wrote:
The majority’s statement that its adoption of the preponderance-of-theevidence standard “is suggested by the Guidelines,” its first purported
authority, is just f lat out wrong. There is no Sentencing Guideline that
addresses the issue of the standard of proof in a criminal case. Indeed, that
would be beyond the authority granted to the Sentencing Commission.91

Finding no authority for the majority’s holding, Judge Sloviter held that the Due
Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the finding of the
separate offense sentencing enhancement.92
However, although he criticized the majority for supporting its conclusion with
cases addressing Sixth Amendment challenges,93 Judge Sloviter falls into the same
trap as the majority in his own analysis. The dissent relies on cases such as
Cunningham v. California,94 Apprendi,95 and even Booker 96 to support its conclusion
that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires a heightened burden
of proof in establishing the separate offense enhancement factor.97 While these cases
do focus on the effect of depriving criminal defendants of certain constitutional
rights, they do not address Fifth Amendment challenges specifically.
While the dissent 98 reaches what this comment argues to be the correct
conclusion, it fails to apply the correct analysis. The dissent, like the majority,
applied a Sixth Amendment analysis to a Fifth Amendment issue. The concurring
90. Id. at 591.
91.

Id. at 592. This is not the first time the commentary to section 6A1.3 has come under scrutiny. See,
e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 319 n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The commentary to § 6A1.3 states that the
Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate . . . . The
Court’s holding today corrects this mistaken belief. The Fifth Amendment requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . .”); Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System,
43 Hous. L. Rev. 341, 387 (2006) (“[T]hough the commentary to Guidelines’ § 6A1.3 states that the
Commission ‘believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate’ . . . in
resolving factual disputes, this provision is overdue for reexamination in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.”).

92.

Id. at 593 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (“Grier’s guilty plea to one offense (for which he would have been
entitled to the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard) cannot justify diminution of the applicable standard
of proof applied by a judge for a separate offense.”).

93.

Id. at 589.

94. 127 S. Ct. 856, 860 (2007) (“The question presented is whether the DSL [California’s determinate

sentencing law], by placing sentence-elevating fact-finding within the judge’s province, violates a
defendant’s right to trial by jury safeguarded by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold that
it does.”).
95. See, e.g., Aprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
96. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 234–44.
97.

See Grier, 475 F.3d at 588–604 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).

98. Judge McKee, in a separate dissenting opinion to which Judge Sloviter joined, also falls into the trap of

applying Sixth Amendment precedent to a Fifth Amendment issue. See Grier, 475 F.3d at 604–21
(McKee, J., dissenting).
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opinion of Judge Ambro correctly advocates for the application of a separate analysis
for a Fifth Amendment issue, but misapplies the appropriate Fifth Amendment test,
and thus reaches the wrong conclusion. To correctly resolve the issue presented in
Grier—that of whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires
that the separate offense sentence enhancement factor be found by the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard—the Third Circuit should have applied the Supreme
Court’s only articulated Fifth Amendment analysis related to this issue: that which
was presented in McMillan. McMillan provides the analytical guidance necessary to
correctly decide the Fifth Amendment issue presented in Grier. The Court in
McMillan expressly stated that it did not, and could not, create a bright line rule for
determining which sentencing factors allow a preponderance standard and which
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order to comport with due process. The
Court did offer some guidance, however, by pointing to several factors which, if
satisfied, could trigger a heightened evidentiary standard.99 Had the court in Grier
applied the Fifth Amendment standard set forth in McMillan, it would have found
that the commission of a separate offense as a sentence enhancement factor requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order to comport with the Due Process Clause.
The Court’s discussion in McMillan suggested that a heightened evidentiary
burden would be required by the Due Process Clause if a sentencing factor was “a tail
which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”100 Although this metaphor may be
ambiguous on its face, the Court outlined several circumstances that illustrate the
standard it created.101 For example, if the sentencing factor effectively “discard[s] the
presumption of innocence” or “reliev[es] the prosecution of its burden of proving
guilt,” then the factor would need proof by an evidentiary standard higher than the
preponderance standard.102 The Court also created a possible exception to its use of
the preponderance standard for sentencing factors which “alter[ ] the maximum
penalty for the crime committed[ ]or create[ ] a separate offense calling for a separate
penalty.” 103 Finally, the Court reserved another possible exception to the
preponderance standard when the sentencing factor could be construed as an attempt
“to evade the commands of Winship.”104
McMillan recognized a distinction between the rights protected under the Fifth
Amendment and those provided by the Sixth Amendment that the court in Grier

99. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91 (“Our inability to lay down any ‘bright line’ test may leave the constitutionality

of statutes more like those in Mullaney and Specht than is the Pennsylvania statute to depend on
differences of degree, but the law is full of situations in which differences of degree produce different
results.”).
100. Id. at 88; see also Grier, 475 F.3d at 580 (Ambro, J., concurring).
101. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88; Grier, 475 F.3d at 580 (Ambro, J., concurring).
102. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86–87.
103. Id. at 87–88.
104. Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
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failed to see.105 In so doing, the Grier court failed to recognize the significant
difference between a Fifth and Sixth Amendment analysis, mainly that “McMillan
provided caveats to its general Fifth Amendment rule—caveats which the Apprendi
line does not create in the Sixth Amendment context,”106 and caveats that trigger the
use of a higher evidentiary standard in a variety of sentencing hearings.107 This is a
mistake. The caveats set forth in McMillan protect a defendant’s Fifth Amendment
rights to the due process of law, a right different from those protected under the
Sixth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has expressly refused to overrule McMillan,108 arguably
because it provides the Court’s only articulated Fifth Amendment standard on the
burden of persuasion necessary for proving the existence of facts pertaining to
sentencing.109 While McMillan states that the preponderance standard is generally
acceptable, it sets out factors that, when satisfied, provide an exception to the general
rule and trigger the need for a heightened evidentiary standard.110 The court’s
consideration in Grier of whether the appellant committed a crime separate from the
one for which he was charged for the purposes of determining sentencing met three
of the requirements necessary under McMillan to satisfy an exception to the Court’s
general preponderance rule, thereby requiring a heightened evidentiary standard.
105. The court in Grier applied the bright line rule set forth in Apprendi. See Grier, 475 F.3d at 578–79

(Ambro, J., concurring); see also supra note 73 (noting that Apprendi’s beyond a reasonable doubt
requirement is only implicated in situations where the sentence imposed exceeds the statutory
maximum).
106. Grier, 475 F.3d at 578–79 (Ambro, J., concurring).
107. Many courts have applied the “tail that wags the dog” standard articulated in McMillan. See, e.g.,

United States v. Mezas de Jesus, 217 F.3d 638, 642–45 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring the finding of an
uncharged kidnapping be found by clear and convincing evidence when the finding would result in a
nine-level enhancement under the U.S.S.G., increasing the sentencing range from 31–27 months to
57–71 months (citing United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 659–60 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting
Kikumura)); United States v. Paster, 173 F.3d 206, 216–17 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the government,
in seeking a nine-level departure from the sentencing range prescribed by the U.S.S.G., conceded that
it should prove all necessary sentencing factors by a clear and convincing standard); United States v.
Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1287–89 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence of all
factors relevant to the seven-fold increase to the fine calculated under the U.S.S.G. as sought by the
government); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1110 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the magnitude of
the contemplated departure [from the range prescribed by the U.S.S.G] is sufficiently great that the
sentencing hearing can fairly be characterized as a ‘tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense’
[then] . . . the factfinding underlying that departure must be established at least by clear and convincing
evidence.”).
108. Grier, 475 F.3d at 578 (Ambro, J., concurring) (“Apprendi and Harris made clear that McMillan still sets

out the Fifth Amendment rule applicable to the burden of proof for sentencing factors.”); Harris v.
United States, 536 U.S. 545, 550, 568 (2002) (reaffirming Winship after considering “whether Winship
stands after Apprendi.”); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 (“We limit [McMillan’s] holding to cases that do not
involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established
by the jury’s verdict—a limitation identified in the McMillan opinion itself.”).
109. Grier, 475 F.3d at 578 (Ambro, J., concurring) (“[I]t is not Apprendi, Blakely, or Booker that solve the due

process question here, as suggested by the majority. Instead, it is McMillan.”).
110. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.
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The “commission of a separate offense” enhancement factor111 requires proof by an
evidentiary standard higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard because
it has the effect of “relieving the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt,”112
“create[es] a separate offense calling for a separate penalty,”113 and most importantly
could be construed as an attempt on the part of the government “to evade the
commands of Winship.”114
The facts in Grier clearly establish the existence of the first two McMillan factors.
By proving the existence of the separate offense enhancement to the sentencing judge
by a preponderance of the evidence, the government was relieved of its burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Grier had committed the crime of aggravated
assault.115 Furthermore, the government was able to effectively punish Grier for
conduct associated with a separate crime.116 This point was best articulated by Judge
Ambro in her concurrence:
[I]f our society, through its law, deems a certain fact worth punishing (or
warranting additional punishment), then the Constitution commands certain
procedural protections attending the finding of that fact. Rather than
following this principle of fundamental fairness, however, our law—through
use of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—criminalizes activity “on the
cheap.” Despite Apprendi and its progeny, we continue to allow sentencing
judges, once a jury has found beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has
committed one crime, then to find him guilty by a preponderance of the
evidence of other crimes for which he was not tried—or worse, tried and
acquitted—and to sentence him as if he had been convicted of them as well.
In effect, we have a shadow criminal code under which, for certain suspected
offenses, a defendant receives few of the trial protections mandated by the
Constitution.117

Satisfying the third McMillan factor—that of an attempt on the part of the
government to “evade the commands of Winship”118—is somewhat more complicated.
The Court in Winship confirmed that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was
not merely a constitutional assumption, but rather a constitutional requirement under
the Due Process Clause,119 and therefore extended the requirement not only to all
111. See supra note 13.
112. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86–87.
113. Id. at 87–88.

The government never has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant
committed the crime of aggravated assault under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat § 2702(a).

114. Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
115. See Grier, 475 F.3d at 559. Grier had been charged with aggravated assault by Pennsylvania authorities,

but for reasons not indicated in the record, those charges were dropped. Id.
116. Id. at 574 (Ambro, J., concurring).
117. Id.
118. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89.
119. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-

doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
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facts necessary to constitute the crime charged, but also to all factors that would have
the same effect on a defendant’s liberty and societal reputation as those of a criminal
conviction.120 In other words, the finding of any factor that would increase a
defendant’s loss of liberty or negatively stigmatize an individual in a way that is
similar to the stigmatization associated with a criminal conviction should comport
with the requirements necessary to ensure the due process of law—including the
right to have the aforementioned factors be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.121
The Court’s due process concerns in Winship apply with even greater force to the
sentencing factor found by a preponderance of the evidence in Grier. While affirming
the district court’s finding that the appellant in Grier committed aggravated assault
under Pennsylvania law did not expose him to a prison sentence that exceeded the
statutory maximum (and thus comported with Apprendi),122 the finding impacted his
loss of liberty123 and carried with it the same stigmatization as an aggravated assault
conviction. The separate offense sentence enhancement gave the court the
opportunity to make a determination that the defendant was guilty of aggravated
assault based on a preponderance of the evidence, whereas the same determination
would have required guilt beyond a reasonable doubt had the appellant been charged
with aggravated assault.124 In Winship, Justice Harlan made a similar observation
about the juvenile delinquency determination at issue in that case and found
that a statute that permits a determination of juvenile delinquency, founded
on a charge of criminal conduct, to be made on a standard of proof that is less
rigorous than that which would obtain had the accused been tried for the
same conduct in an ordinary criminal case . . . offends the requirement of
fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause . . . .125

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.”).
120. Id. at 366–68.
121. Id. at 363–64. The Court in Winship stated that:

The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance,
both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of
the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that
values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for
commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.
Id.
122. Supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
123. The four-level enhancement increased the recommended prison sentence by fifty percent. Grier, 475

F.3d at 560.
124. See Grier, 475 F.3d at 593 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (“Although Grier pled guilty to possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon . . . no jury found him guilty of aggravated assault, a different and independent
offense. Grier’s guilty plea to one offense . . . cannot justify diminution of the applicable standard of
proof applied by a judge for a separate offense.”).
125. Winship, 397 U.S. at 369 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Although Justice Harlan’s finding was made on the grounds that the statute at issue
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conclusion is
certainly applicable under the Fifth Amendment to the parallel circumstances
presented in Grier.
The separate offense sentence enhancement found by a preponderance of the
evidence in Grier exposed the appellant to punishment for a crime for which he was
never convicted.126 The separate offense enhancement thus relieved the prosecution
of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Grier was guilty of aggravated
assault. The separate offense enhancement also met the second factor necessary to
create an exception under McMillan, warranting the use of the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard,127 in that it allowed the court to punish Grier for a separate crime
defined by the legislature of Pennsylvania without convicting him of that second
crime. The separate offense enhancement also triggers the third exception described
in McMillan, in that it is an attempt by the legislature to “evade the commands of
Winship.”128 The commands of Winship serve to safeguard the due process rights of
criminal defendants when liberty and stigmatization are at stake, as they were for
Grier.129 Sentencing factors that satisfy exceptions under McMillan require a
heightened evidentiary standard130 and the dual aims of Winship require the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.131 It follows that in order to comport with due
process under the Fifth Amendment, the finding of the commission of a separate
offense as grounds for an enhancement to Grier’s sentence should have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.

126. See Grier, 475 F.3d at 574 (Ambro, J., concurring).
127. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87–88.
128. Id. at 89.
129. Winship, 399 U.S. at 363–64.
130. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88; Grier, 475 F.3d at 580 (Ambro, J., concurring).
131. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363–68.
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